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Abstract 
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1 Introduction
In a Tullock contest see Tullock (1980) a players probability of winning the prize is the
ratio of the e¤ort he exerts and the total e¤ort all players exert. We show that information
advantages are rewarded in Tullock contests in which the players common value for the
prize is uncertain: if a player i has better information than some other player j, then the
expected payo¤ of player i is greater than or equal to that of player j. This result holds for
any two players with rankable information elds, regardless of the information endowments
of the other players in the contest. The arguments behind our result rely on the proof of
a theorem of Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2002) showing that information advantages are
rewarded in the Bayesian Cournot equilibria of oligopolistic industries with linear costs, and
on the well known formal equivalence between a Tullock contest and a Cournot oligopoly 
see, e.g., Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997).
2 Tullock Contests
In a (common-value) Tullock contest a group of players N = f1; :::; ng; with n  2; compete
for a prize by simultaneously choosing their e¤orts, x = (x1; :::; xn) 2 Rn+. The prize is
awarded to the players in a probabilistic fashion: if x 2 Rn+nf0g; then the probability that
player i 2 N wins the prize is (x) = xi=
Pn
k=1 xk; whereas if x = 0, then the prize is
allocated according to some xed probability vector (0) 2 4n: Playersuncertainty about
the value of the prize is described by a probability space (
;F ; p), where 
 is the set of
states of nature, F is a -eld of subsets of 
; and p is a probability measure on (
;F)
representing the playerscommon prior belief. Playerscommon value for the prize is an
F-measurable and bounded random variable V : 
 ! R++. The private information of
player i 2 N is described by a -subeld of F , which we denote by Fi. This means that for
any event A 2 Fi player i knows whether the realized state of nature is contained in A; in
particular, if Fi is generated by a nite or countably innite partition of 
; then i knows
the element of the partition containing the realized state of nature.
A Tullock contest denes a Bayesian game in which the set of actions of each player is
R+, and for ! 2 
 and x 2 Rn+ the payo¤ of player i 2 N is
ui(!; x) = (x)V (!)  xi: (1)
2
(Note that if the cost of e¤ort is of the form W (!)x; where W is a non-negative random
variable such that infW > 0; then the resulting payo¤ function is an a¢ ne transformation
of the function (1). Hence our results also hold in this case, i.e., when the players constant
marginal cost of e¤ort W is uncertain.) In this game, a pure strategy for player i 2 N is
an Fi-measurable and integrable function Xi : 
 ! R+; which describes is choice of e¤ort
in each state of nature. (The measurability restriction implies that player i can condition
his e¤ort only on his private information.) An equilibrium of a Tullock contest is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game dened by the contest. We restrict attention to pure
strategies.
3 Reward to Information Advantages
The proposition below shows that (with some qualication) information advantages are re-
warded in Tullock contests. For any F-measurable random variable f , we denote by E[f j Fi]
a random variable which is (a version of) the conditional expectation with respect to the
-eld Fi see, e.g., Borkar (1995) for a formal denition. Also for any prole of strategies
X = (X1; :::; Xn), we denote by X i the prole obtained from X by suppressing the strategy
of player i.
Proposition. Let X be an equilibrium of a Tullock contest such that inf
Pn
j=1Xj > 0: If
player i has an information advantage over player j; i.e., Fj  Fi, then
E[ui(; X ()]  E[uj(; X ()]:
Proof. For any strategy prole X = (X1; :::; Xn) and state of nature ! 2 
; the payo¤ of
each player i 2 N may be written as
ui(!;X(!)) =
Xi(!)Pn
j=1Xj(!)
V (!)  c(Xi(!))
= P (!;
Xn
j=1
Xj(!))Xi(!))  C(!;Xi(!));
where the functions P : 
 R++ ! R+ and C : 
 R+ ! R+ are dened as
P (!; x) =
V (!)
x
; (2)
3
and C(!; x) = x: Thus, if X is an equilibrium of the contests, then X is an equilibrium of
the symmetric oligopolistic industry in which the players are the rms, the inverse market
demand is the function P , and the rmscost is C.
Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2002) show that information advantages are rewarded in
any equilibrium of an oligopolistic industry under certain conditions on the inverse demand
and cost functions. Although the function P in (2) does not satisfy these conditions, the
proof of Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2002) applies to the present setting provided that
E

1Xi>0 
d
dxi
ui(; X ()) j Fi

= 0 (3)
holds for every i 2 N: This equation immediately yields equation (2.6) of Einy, Moreno and
Shitovitz (2002), page 157, from which point on the proof applies without change.
We establish equation (3). For any " 2 R dene X 0i;" := maxfXi + "; 0g: Then for every
! 2 

lim
"!0+
1Xi>0 (!) 
ui(!;X i (!) ; X 0i;" (!))  ui(!;X (!))
"
(4)
= lim
"!0+
1Xi>0 (!) 
ui(!;X i (!) ; X 0i; " (!))  ui(!;X (!))
 "
= 1Xi>0 (!) 
d
dxi
ui(!;X (!));
where for x 2 Rn+
d
dxi
ui(!; x) =
P
j2Nnfig xj
xi +
P
j2Nnfig xj
2V (!)  1: (5)
Since V has bounded support, there exists b > v := supV: It follows that Xi is bounded
from above by b almost everywhere on 
, as otherwise the expected equilibrium payo¤ of
player i would be negative conditional on some positive-measure event Ai 2 Fi, making it
protable for player i to deviate to Yi = 1
nAi Xi: Write inf
P
i2N Xi := a > 0. Since for
every ! the function ui(!; x) is concave in xi; for any " 2
 
0; a
2

and ! 2 
ui(!;X i (!) ; X 0i;" (!))  ui(!;X (!))"
  maxf ddxiui(!;X (!))
 ; duidxi (!;X i (!) ; Xi;" (!))
g
(6)
and
ui(!;X i (!) ; X 0i; " (!))  ui(!;X (!)) "
  maxfdui(!;X (!))dxi
 ; dui(!;X i (!) ; Xi; " (!))dxi
g:
(7)
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Since
P
j2NnfigXj +Xi; "  a2 for " 2
 
0; a
2

, it follows from (5) that the right-hand side
functions in both (6) and (7) are bounded from above by 4b+2a
a2
v + 1 when " 2  0; a
2

. Using
this fact, (4), and the conditional dominated convergence theorem, we obtain
lim
"!0+
E

1Xi>0 ()
ui(; X i () ; X 0i;" ())  ui(; X ())
"
j Fi

(8)
= lim
"!0+
E

1Xi>0 ()
ui(; X i () ; X 0i; " ())  ui(; X ())
 " j Fi

= E

1Xi>0 ()
d
dxi
ui(; X ()) j Fi

:
As 1Xi>0 is Fi-measurable and can be extracted from the expectation, by using (6) and (7)
with all three terms multiplied by 1Xi>0, and (8), we obtain
E

1Xi>0 ()
d
dxi
ui(; X ()) j Fi

= 0: 
The following remark establishes that the qualication in the proposition holds under
some general conditions.
Remark. Let X be an equilibrium of a classic Tullock contest in which either (i) F1; :::;Fn
are nite, or (ii) n = 2 and inf V > 0. Then inf
Pn
j=1Xj > 0:
Proof. Assume (i) holds. Since
P
i2N Xi is measurable with respect to _i2NFi (the small-
est -eld containing each Fi), which is nite, the probabilities p
 P
i2N Xi  a

can take
only nitely many values in [0; 1]: Let  = maxa>0 p
 P
i2N Xi  a

; and suppose the max-
imum is attained at a0 > 0: By Remark 1,
P
i2N Xi > 0 in any equilibrium X, and hence
lima&0 p
 P
i2N Xi  a

= p
 P
i2N Xi > 0

= 1: Therefore  = 1 and a0 is the desired bound
for the equilibrium sum of e¤orts.
Assume (ii) and, w.l.o.g., that player 2 has an information advantage over player 1. Write
v := inf V and v = supV; and let " 2 (0; v
12
): Also, let a 2 (0; ") be such that
2a
"+ 2a
<
"
2v
:
(Such value exists because the left-hand side vanishes when a ! 0+.) Now consider an
equilibriumX of the contest. We will show thatX1  a. Assume by the way of contradiction
that X1 < a. Then there exists a positive-measure set A1 2 F1 such that X1 < a on A1: We
show that X2  " almost everywhere on A1:
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Suppose to the contrary that X2 > " on some positive-measure A2 2 F2 which is a subset
of A1. Consider a strategy
X 02 =
"
2
 1A2 +Xi  1
nA2
in S2: Then, by switching from X2 to X 02 player 2 decreases his expected reward by at most
2a
"+2a
v  p(A2); and simultaneously decreases his expected cost by at least "2  p(A2): By the
choice of a; the rst expression is smaller than the second, and hence deviating to X 02 is, in
expectation, protable for player 2; which contradicts that X is an equilibrium.
It follows that maxfX1; X2g  " almost everywhere on A1. Let i be a player for whom
E[i(X) j A1]  12 ; and consider a strategy
X 00i = 3"  1A1 +Xi  1
nA1
SinceA1 2 F1 F2; X 00i is measurable with respect to bothF1 andF2; and hence with respect
to Fi: Further, i(X)  i(X i; X 00i ) almost everywhere on A1; and that E(i(X i; X 00i ) j
A1)  34 (this is due to the fact that, almost everywhere on A1; i(X i; X 00i )  3"3"+" = 34):
Thus, by switching fromXi toX 00i player i increases his expected payo¤by at least
1
4
v p(A1);
while increasing his expected cost by at most 3"  p(A1): By the choice of "; such a deviation
leads to a net gain in the expected payo¤, which contradicts that X is an equilibrium. We
conclude that, indeed, X1  a: 
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